In short: understanding is causal propositional knowledge. DePaul, M. Ugly Analysis and Value in A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. Pritchard (eds. Trout, J.D. Making such an epistemological shift can then open up the possibility of communication with other-than-human persons in ways that few educational researchers seem able (or willing) to acknowledge (see Harvey, 2003). In this sense, the history of thought can be seen as the sometimes imperceptibly fluid, sometimes bizarre and abrupt, movements of our concepts. Kvanvig identifies the main opponent to his view, that the scope of curiosity is enough to support the unrestricted value of understanding, to be one on which knowledge is what is fundamental to curiosity. Stanley, J and Williamson, T. Knowing How. Journal of Philosophy 98(8) (2001): 411-444. The conspiracy theorist possesses something which one who grasps (rather than grasps*) a correct theory also possesses, and yet one who fails to grasp* even the conspiracy theory (for example, a would-be conspiracy theorist who has yet to form a coherent picture of how the false propositions fit together) lacks. Considers some of the ramifications that active externalist approaches might have for epistemology. But it is not strictly true. DePaul, M. and Grimm, S. Review Essay: Kvanvigs The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 74 (2007): 498-514. Put generally, according to the coherentist family of proposals of the structure of justified belief, a belief or set of beliefs is justified, or justifiably held, just in case the belief coheres with a set of beliefs, the set forms a coherent system, or some variation on these themes (Olsson 2012: 1). Grimm anticipates this point and expresses a willingness to embrace a looser conception of dependence than causal dependence, one that includes (following Kim 1994) species of dependence such as mereological dependences (that is, dependence of a whole on its parts), evaluative dependences (that is, dependence of evaluative on non-evaluative), and so on. These similar states share some of the features we typically think understanding requires, but which are not bona fide understanding specifically because a plausible factivity condition is not satisfied. So, understanding is compatible with a kind of epistemic luck that knowledge excludes. Armed with this distinction, Pritchard criticizes Kvanvigs assessment of the Comanche case by suggesting that just how we should regard understanding as being compatible or incompatible with epistemic luck depends on how we fill out the details of Kvanvigs case, which is potentially ambiguous between two kinds of readings. The Value of Understanding In D. Pritchard, A. Haddock and A. Millar (eds. Wilkenfeld suggests that this ability consists at least partly in being able to correct minor mistakes in ones mental representation and use it to make assessments in similar cases. Outlines a view on which understanding something requires making reasonable sense of it. To complicate matters further, some of the philosophers who appear to endorse one approach over the other can elsewhere be seen considering a more mixed view (for example, Khalifa 2013b). But is understanding factive? For example, by trusting someone I should not have trusted, or even worse, by reading tea leaves which happened to afford me true beliefs about chemistry. Must they be known or can they be Gettiered true beliefs? Regarding factivity, then, it seems there is room for a view that occupies the middle ground here. However, Kelp admits that he wonders how his account will make sense of the link between understanding and explanation, and one might also wonder whether it is too strict to say that understanding requires knowledge as opposed to justified belief or justified true belief. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) (Vol. However, Pritchards work on epistemic luck (for example, 2005) and how it is incompatible with knowledge leads him to reason that understanding is immune to some but not all forms of malignant luck (that is, luck which is incompatible with knowledge). Kvanvig (2013) claims that both of these views are mistaken, and in the course of doing so, locates curiosity at the center of his account of understandings value. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. In particular, as Pritchard suggests, we might want to consider that agents working with the ideal gas law or other idealizations do not necessarily have false beliefs as a result, even if the content of the proposition expressed by the law is not strictly true. 1pt1): pp. He also suggests that what epistemic agents want is not just to feel like they are making sense of things but to actually make sense of them. A central component of Kvanvigs argument is negative; he regards knowledge as ill-suited to play the role of satisfying curiosity, and in particular, by rejecting three arguments from Whitcomb to this effect. To what extent do the advantages and disadvantages of, for example, sensitive invariantist, contextualist, insensitive invariantist and relativist approaches to knowledge attributions find parallels in the case of understanding attributions. To the extent that this is right, Zagzebski is endorsing a kind of KU principle (compare: KK). A worry about this move can be put abstractly: consider that if understanding entails true beliefs of form , and that beliefs of form
must themselves be the result of exercising reliable cognitive abilities, it might still be that ones reliable
-generating abilities are exercised in a bad environment. This allows the agent to produce a slightly different mental representation of the subject matter that enables efficacious inferences pertaining to (or manipulations of) the subject matter. If a grasping condition is necessary for understanding, does one satisfy this condition only when one exercises a grasping ability to reflect how things are in the world? ), The Routledge Companion to Epistemology. Sliwa, P. IVUnderstanding and Knowing. The Nature of Ability and the Purpose of Knowledge. Philosophical Issues 17 (2007): 57-69. Rohwer, Y. However, Baker (2003) has offered an account on which at least some instances of understanding-why are non-factive. Such discussions, though they can be initially helpful, raise a nest of further questions. Elgin, C. Z. Offers an account of understanding that requires having a theory of the relevant phenomenon. Although, many commentators suggest that understanding requires something further, that is something in additional to merely knowing a proposition or propositions, Grimm thinks we can update the knowledge of causes view so that this intuition is accommodated and explained. Hills herself does not believe that understanding-why is some kind of propositional knowledge, but she points out that even if it is there is nonetheless good cause to think that understanding-why is very unlike ordinary propositional knowledge. That is, we often describe an individual as having a better understanding of a subject matter than some other person, perhaps when choosing whom to approach for advice or when looking for someone to teach us about a subject. However, it is less clear at least initially that retreating from causal dependence to more general dependence will be of use in the kinds of objectual understanding cases noted above. Drawing from Stanley and Williamson, she makes the distinction between knowing a proposition under a practical mode of presentation and knowing it under a theoretical mode of presentation. Stanley and Williamson admit that the former is especially tough to spell out (see Glick 2014 for a recent discussion), but it must surely involve having complex dispositions, and so it is perhaps possible to know some proposition under only one of these modes of presentation (that is, by lacking the relevant dispositions, or something else). In contrast with Pritchards partial compatibility view of the relationship between understanding and epistemic luck, where understanding is compatible with environmental but not with intervening luck, Rohwer (2014) defends understandings full compatibility with veritic epistemic luck (that is, of both intervening and environmental varieties). Eds. For that reason, these will be addressed before moving on to the more explicitly epistemological concerns. Decent Essays. However, epistemologists have recently started to turn more attention to the epistemic state or states of understanding, asking questions about its nature, relationship to knowledge, connection with explanation, and potential status as a special type of cognitive achievement. Would this impede ones understanding? Abstract. On the other hand, there are explanationists, who argue that it is knowledge or evaluation of explanations that is doing the relevant work. Autore dell'articolo: Articolo pubblicato: 16/06/2022 Categoria dell'articolo: fixed gantry vs moving gantry cnc Commenti dell'articolo: andy's dopey transposition cipher andy's dopey transposition cipher When considering interesting features that might set understanding apart from propositional knowledge, the idea of grasping something is often mentioned. Morris (2012), like Rohwer, also defends lucky understandingin particular, understanding-why, or what he calls explanatory understanding). Nevertheless, considering weakly factive construals of objective understanding draws attention to an important pointthat there are also interesting epistemic states in the neighborhood of understanding. An overview of wisdom, including its potential relationship to understanding. Likewise, just as all understanding will presumably involve achieving intelligibility even though intelligibility does not entail understanding, so too will all grasping involve grasping* even though grasping* does not entail grasping. For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. Many seem to blend manipulationism with explanations, suggesting for example that what is required for understanding is an ability associated with mentally manipulating explanations. A longer discussion of the nature of understanding and its distinctive value (in relation to the value of knowledge) than in his related papers. In . Contains the famous counterexamples to the Justified True Belief account of knowledge. If the former, then this is unfortunate given the theoretical work the term is supposed to be doing in characterizing understanding. The guiding task was to clarify what versions of historical epistemology exist and the pros and cons each of them presents. This line merits discussion not least because the idea that understanding-why comes by degrees is often ignored in favor of discussing the more obvious point that understanding a subject matter clearly comes by degrees. reptarium brian barczyk; new milford high school principal; salisbury university apparel store In addition, Zagzebski supports the provocative line that understanding can perhaps sometimes be more desirable when the epistemic agent does not have the relevant true beliefs. Further, suppose that the self-proclaimed psychic even has reason to believe he is right to think he is psychic, as his friends and family deem that it is safer or kinder to buy into his delusions outwardly. sustainability scholarship 2021; lost vape centaurus replacement panels; Taking curiosity to be of epistemic significance is not a new idea. Finally, on the other side of the spectrum from Zagzebski and Kvanvig, and also in opposition with Pritchard, is the view that understandings immunity to epistemic luck is isomorphic to knowledges immunity to epistemic luck. Introduces intelligibility as an epistemic state similar to understanding but less valuable. Fifthly, to what extent might active externalist approaches (for example, extended mind and extended cognition) in epistemology, the ramifications of which have recently been brought to bear on the theory of knowledge (see Carter, et. Though the demandingness of this ability need not be held fixed across practical circumstances. Argues that understanding (unlike knowledge) is a type of cognitive achievement and therefore of distinctive value. Owing to Kvanvigs use of the words perceived achievement, Grimm thinks that the curiosity account of understandings value suggests that subjective understanding (or what is referred to as intelligibility above) can satisfy the desire to make sense of the world or really marks the legitimate end of inquiry.. As such, Khalifa is not attempting to provide an analysis of grasping. In rationalism way of thinking, knowledge is acquired using reasons or reasoning. It seems as though understanding would possibly be undermined in a case where someone relying on the ideal gas law failed to appreciate it as an idealization. However, if understanding-why actually is a type of knowing how then this means that intellectualist arguments to the effect that knowing how is a kind of propositional knowledge might apply, mutatis mutandis, to understanding-why as well (see Carter and Pritchard 2013). Claims that understanding is entirely compatible with both intervening and environmental forms of veritic luck. Incudes arguments for the position that understanding need not be factive. According to Grimm, cases like Kvanvig admit of a more general characterisation, depending on how the details are filled in. Toon (2015) has recently suggested, with reference to the hypothesis of extended cognition, that understanding can be located partly outside the head. According to Elgin, a factive conception of understanding neither reflects our practices in ascribing understanding nor does justice to contemporary science. Finally, Section 6 proposes various potential avenues for future research, with an eye towards anticipating how considerations relating to understanding might shed light on a range of live debates elsewhere in epistemology and in philosophy more generally. This skeptical argument is worth engaging with, presumably with the goal of showing that understanding does not turn out to be internally indistinguishable from mere intelligibility. Explores the pros and cons with at least 2 credible sources. Carter, J. As Lackey thinks students can come to know evolutionary theory from this teacher despite the teacher not knowing the propositions she asserts (given that the Stella fails the belief condition for knowledge), we might likewise think, and contra Morris, that Stella might fail to understand evolution. Another seemingly promising lineone that engages with the relation question discussed aboveviews grasping as intimately connected with a certain set of abilities. More specifically, Kvanvig aims to support the contention that objectual understanding has a special value knowledge lacks by arguing that the nature of curiositythe motivational element that drives cognitive machinery (2013: 152)underwrites a way of vindicating understandings final value. Zagzebski does not mean to say that to understand X, one must also understand ones own understanding of X (as this threatens a psychologically implausible regress), but rather, that to understand X one must also understand that one understands X. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. On such an interpretation, explanationism can be construed as offering a simple answer to the object question discussed above: the object of understanding-relevant grasping would, on this view, be explanations. His central claim is that curiosity provides hope for a response-dependent or behaviour-centred explanation of the value of whatever curiosity involves or aims at. body positive tiktok accounts; tough guise 2 summary sparknotes; tracking polls quizlet Though her work on understanding is not limited to scientific understanding (for example, Elgin 2004), one notable argument she has made is framed to show that a factive conception cannot do justice to the cognitive contributions of science and that a more flexible conception can (2007: 32). As such, his commentary here is particularly relevant to the question of whether gasping is factive. Grimm, S. Is Understanding a Species of Knowledge? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 57 (2006): 515-535. This is the idea that one has shifted, or changed, the way he or she takes in knowledge. philos201 Assignment Details Recall that epistemology is the branch of philosophy concerned with knowledge. But, the chief requirement of understanding, for him, is instead that there be the right coherence-making relations in some agents collection of information (that is, that the agent has a grasp of how all this related information fits together. An overview of coherentism that can be useful when considering how theories of coherence might be used to flesh out the grasping condition on understanding. This objection is worth holding in mind when considering any further positions that incorporate representation manipulability as necessary. Secondly, there is plenty of scope for understanding to play a more significant role in social epistemology. An in-depth exploration of different types of epistemic luck. Pritchard (2008: 8) points out thatfor exampleif one believes that ones house burned down because of the actions of an arsonist when it really burnt down because of faulty wiring, it just seems plain that one lacks understanding of why ones house burned down. Builds an account of understanding according to which understanding a subject matter involves possessing a representation that could be manipulated in a useful way. Know How. Of course, though, just as Lackey (2007) raises creationist teacher style cases against knowledge transmission principles, one might as well raise a parallel kind of creationist teacher case against the thesis that one cannot attain understanding from a source who herself lacks it. ), The Continuum Companion to Epistemology. Curiosity and a Response-Dependent Account of the Value of Understanding. In T. Henning and D. Schweikard (eds. Batterman, R. W. Idealization and modelling. Synthese, 169(3) (2009): 427-446. In short, then, Kvanvig wants to insist that the true beliefs that one attains in acquiring ones understanding can all be Gettiered, even though the Gettier-style luck which prevents these beliefs from qualifying as knowledge does not undermine the understanding this individual acquires. Strevens, however, holds that than an explanation is only correct if its constitutive propositions are true, and therefore the reformulation of grasping that he provides is not intended by Strevens to be used in an actual account of understanding. Achievements are thought of as being intrinsically good, though the existence of evil achievements (for example, skillfully committing genocide) and trivial achievements (for example, competently counting the blades of grass on a lawn) shows that we are thinking of successes that have distinctive value as achievements (Pritchard 2010: 30) rather than successes that have all-things-considered value. Includes further discussion of the role of acceptance and belief in her view of understanding. Secondly, one might wonder if Wilkenfelds account of understanding as representation manipulation is too inclusivethat it rules in, as cases of bona fide understanding, representations that are based on inaccurate but internally consistent beliefs. Examples of the sort considered suggest thateven if understanding has some important internalist component to ittransparency of the sort Zagzebski is suggesting when putting forward the KU claim, is an accidental property of only some cases of understanding and not essential to understanding. ), Epistemic Value. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999. Contains exploration of whether the value knowledge may be in part determined by the extent to which it provides answers to questions one is curious about. In the study of epistemology, philosophers are concerned with the epistemological shift. A view on which the psychics epistemic position in this case qualifies as understanding-why would be unsatisfactorily inclusive. Olsson, E. Coherentist Theories of Epistemic Justification in E. Zalta (ed. Relatedly, if framed in terms of credence, what credence threshold must be met, with respect to propositions in some set, for the agent to understand that subject matter? For example, a self-proclaimed psychic might see someone trip and believe that he caused this persons fall. iwi galil ace rs regulate; pedestrian killed in london today; holly woodlawn biography; how to change icon size in samsung s21; houston marriott westchase Argues that we should replace the main developed accounts of understanding with earlier accounts of scientific explanation. He argues that intuitions that rule against lucky understanding can be explained away. Criticizes the claim that understanding-why should be identified with strong cognitive achievement. A. and Gordon, E. C. On Pritchard, Objectual Understanding and the Value Problem. American Philosophical Quarterly 51 (2014): 1-14. Orand this is a point that has received little attentioneven more weakly, can the true beliefs be themselves unreliably formed or held on the basis of bad reasons. Contains Lackeys counterexamples to the knowledge transmission principles. It is also becoming an increasingly popular position to hold that understanding is more epistemically valuable than knowledge (see Kvanvig 2003; Pritchard 2010). Grimm (2011) suggests that what we should regard as being understood in cases of objectual understandingnamely, the object of the objectual attitude relationcan be helpfully thought of as akin to a system or structure [that has] parts or elements that depend upon one another in various ways.. Section 5 considers questions about what might explain the value of understanding; for example, various epistemologists have made suggestions focusing on transparency, distinctive types of achievement and curiosity, while others have challenged the assumption that understanding is of special value. A restatement of Grimms view might accordingly be: understanding is knowledge of dependence relations. Often-cited discussion of the fake barn counterexample to traditional accounts of knowledge that focus on justified true belief. Whether wisdom might be a type of understanding or understanding might be a component of wisdom is a fascinating question that can draw on both work in virtue ethics and epistemology. Lipton, P. Understanding Without Explanation in H. de Regt, S. Leonelli, and K. Eigner (eds. Argues that the concerns plaguing theories of knowledge do not cause problems for a theory of understanding. A useful taxonomising question is the following: how strong a link does understanding demand between the beliefs we have about a given subject matter and the propositions that are true of that subject matter? For one thing, if understanding is both a factive and strongly internalist notion then a radical skeptical argument that threatens to show that we have no understanding is a very intimidating prospect (as Pritchard 2010:86 points out). On the most straightforward characterization of her proposal, one fails to possess understanding why, with respect to p, if one lacks any of the abilities outlined in (i-vi), with respect to p. Note that this is compatible with one failing to possess understanding why even if one possesses knowledge that involves, as virtue epistemologists will insist, some kinds of abilities or virtues. This is a point Elgin is happy to grant. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. Given that the result is the same (that is, the patients heart muscle blood supply is improved) regardless of whether he successfully completes the operation by luck or by skill, the instrumental value of the action is the same. south east england accent; spend billionaires money game; kaplan data entry work from home. as in testimony cases in friendly environments, where knowledge acquisition demands very little on the part of the agent), he argues that cognitive achievement is not essentially wedded to knowledge (as robust virtue epistemologists would hold). For example, you read many of your books on screens and e-readers today. The Problem of the External World 2. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. In order to make this point clear, Pritchard suggests that we first consider two versions of a case analogous with Kvanvigs. Boston: Routledge, 2013. Pritchard, D. The Value of Knowledge: Understanding. In A. Haddock, A. Millar and D. Pritchard (eds. An overview of the object, psychology, and normativity of understanding. The Varieties of Cognitive Success 1.1 What Kinds of Things Enjoy Cognitive Success? Unsurprisingly, the comparison between the nature of understanding as opposed to knowledge has coincided with comparisons of their respective epistemic value, particularly since Kvanvig (2003) first defended the epistemic value of the latter to the former. In other words, even though there is no such gas as that referred to in the law, accepting the law need not involve believing the law to be true and thus believing there to be some gas with properties that it lacks. Kvanvig 2003; Zagzebski 2001; Riggs 2003; Pritchard 2010), Grimms view is rooted in a view that comes from the philosophy of science and traces originally to Aristotle. The distinctive aspects can be identified as human abilities to engage in mathematics and intellectual reasoning. As Kvanvig sees it, knowing requires non-accidental links between (internal) mental states and external events in just the right way. Discusses and defines ability in the sense often appealed to in work on cognitive ability and the value of knowledge. For those who wonder about whether the often-discussed grasping associated with understanding might just amount to the possession of further beliefs (rather than, say, the possession of manipulative abilities), this type of view may seem particularly attractive (and comparatively less mysterious). Stanley, J. Wilkenfeld, D. Understanding as Representation Manipulability. Synthese 190 (2013): 997-1016. Specifically, a very weak view of understandings factivity does not fit with the plausible and often expressed intuition that understanding is something especially epistemically valuable. 115, No. If we consider some goalsuch as the successful completion of a coronary bypassit is obvious that our attitude towards the successful coronary bypass is different when the completion is a matter of ability as opposed to luck.
How To Remove Quixx Paint Repair Pen From Car,
Mediterranean Beef Squid Eating Guinea Pig,
Articles E